erc/metu
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN ECONOMICS  IV
September 13-16, 2000, Ankara

Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations

Anne Sibert (Birkbeck College, University of London, CEPR, UK)

Abstract

This paper looks at how the reputation of a monetary policy making committee is jointly determined with the reputations of its individual members. I ask whether individuals how more or less incentives to gain a reputation for being tough on inflation when they are a part of a group. I examine the effect of increased transparency –in the form of publishing the votes of individual members– on individuals’ incentives to appear hard nosed. I look at how other institutional features of central banks affect the policy making body’s incentive to refrain from inflation.

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Middle East Technical University
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